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Abstract  
Karl Popper identified ‘falsifiability’ as the criterion in 
demarcating science from non-science. The method of 
induction, which uses the (debated) principle of 
uniformity of nature, was rejected by Popper. He instead 
suggested that a scientific theory cannot be ‘verifiable’ but 
only ‘falsifiable’; one counter-example to the claims made 
by the theory would falsify it. The paper conducts a 
survey of the extant literature to understand the concept, 
the methodology as suggested by Popper to 
operationalize the concept, and possible limitations, both 
conceptual and methodological. The extant literature 
points out inherent ambiguities in the Popperian concept 
of falsifiabilty. One recurring theme is that Popper, the 
deductivist, uses the much critiqued inductivistic method 
among his methodological suite.  
Keywords: Karl Popper, Demarcation Problem, Falsifiability, 
Problem of Induction 
1. Introduction 
Science can be defined as a systematic endeavor to organize 
knowledge as a set of falsifiable or testable explanations and 
predictions about the universe. One keyword here is testability or 
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falsifiabilty, the bedrock on which science stands. This is probably 
the most important element that distinguishes scientific inquiry 
form other forms of inquiry such as spiritual inquiry. 
Karl Popper (1902-1994), one of the greatest philosophers of science 
is credited with enunciating falsification as a demarcating entity 
between science and non-science (Thornton, 2019). He attended the 
University of Vienna, where he was exposed to the psychoanalytic 
theories propounded by Freud and Adler as well as the Marxian 
theory. While listening to a lecture on the theory of relativity by 
Einstein in Vienna, he was impressed by the ‘critical spirit’ in 
Einstein’s theory, while its complete absence in Marxian and 
Freudian theories which made these theories impervious to 
disconfirmation was of crucial significance according to Popper. 
Popper surmised that a key difference between the two theories 
(Freud’s Psychoanalytic theory and Einstein’s theory of relativity) 
was the intrinsic ‘risk’ in Einstein’s theory which could lead to its 
potential falsification. In contrast, the psychoanalytic theory was, 
even in principle, not falsifiable. The component of risk in 
Einsteinian theory emanated from the fact that highly improbable 
or impossible consequences, as per the Newtonian paradigm (such 
as light bending towards massive objects, a fact confirmed by 
Eddington in 1919), which would, if they were shown to be false, 
falsify the theory. Popper was critical of the Marxian theory as well, 
although Popper admitted that it was initially propounded as a 
truly predictive theory; when facts showed that it was inadequate it 
was worked on by supplementation of ad-hoc hypotheses to reflect 
these facts. Thus, Marxism, a scientific theory, was reduced to a 
“pseudo-scientific dogma” (Thornton, 2019). Hence Popper 
concluded that these “theories” (Psychoanalytic theory, worked-on 
Marxism) were similar to primitive myths and not to modern 
science (Mitra, 2016).  
These experiences led Popper to use falsifiability as the benchmark 
to demarcate (distinguish) science from non-science. A theory would 
be deemed to be scientific if it has the potential to be incompatible 
with at least one or more of all possible empirical observations, 
whereas a theory that is compatible with all possible empirical 
observations, either because it has been modified on an ex-post 
basis to accommodate these observations (such as revised 
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Marxism) or it has been developed to be compatible with all 
possible observations (such as psychoanalytic theories) is 
unscientific. A theory that is unscientific, being unfalsifiable, might 
however, become scientific with the development of technology 
and/or with further refinement of the theory. 
Popper authored three books between 1935 and 1957. The first book 
was named Logik der Forschung (1935), and was translated later to 
English as The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper, 2002)  
[hereinafter L. Sc. D.]. This book provides an overview of his 
notions on science and its philosophy. His other books include The 
Poverty of Historicism (1957) that critiques the idea of historical 
laws and The Open Society and its Enemies (1945), a treatise on 
philosophy of society, history and politics. 
This article intends to introduce Popper’s ideas of falsification in 
the context of philosophy of sciences, conduct a review of the 
literature that critiques Popper’s conceptualization and 
operationalization of falsification, and then discuss and comment 
on the findings. The article collates research that has critiqued his 
ideas, discusses them and comments on the possible limitations 
and merits of Popper’s notions of falsificationalism in the light of 
existing critique.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: this introduction is 
followed by a brief exposition of Popper’s idea of demarcation 
between sciences and non-sciences in section 2. This is followed by 
an analytic understanding of Popper’s criterion of falsifiability in 
the extant literature in section 3. Standard literature has been used 
from a wide array of sources. Results and discussion of findings 
constitute section 4. A conclusion follows in section 5.  
2. Demarcation and Falsifiability 
According to Popper, the principal issue in philosophy of sciences 
is that of demarcation or distinguishing science from non-science, 
such as metaphysics or Freudian psychoanalysis. While accepting 
Hume’s critique of induction as valid, he opines that induction 
should not generally be used by a scientist. He contends that all 
observations are “selective and theory-laden”. Or, in other words, 
there can be no observation without theory. Thus, he challenges the 
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hitherto dominant viewpoint that the inductive method demarcates 
science from non-science.  
Popper thus suggests falsification as a valid method for scientific 
investigation after rejecting induction as a methodology. According 
to Popper a theory can be corroborated as scientific only if it 
endures truly ‘risky’ forecasts which have the potential to turn out 
false. A test of a scientific theory is an attempt to falsify it, with 
only a single counter-instance rendering the whole theory untrue. 
Popper’s idea of demarcation is rooted in the fact that there exists a 
logical asymmetry between verification and falsification: it is 
impossible to conclusively verify a universal proposition by 
induction, whereas one counter-example proves the universal law 
to be false. 
A scientific theory, thus, Popper says is prohibitive in that it 
prohibits certain events. Hence, whereas testing and falsification of 
such a theory is possible, logical verification is not possible. Hence, 
a theory should not be assumed to be verified even after very 
rigorous testing for years. The most that can be said is that it has 
been highly corroborated and is a good candidate to be rated as the 
best available theory till it is falsified. 
However, according to Popper there is a distinction between the 
logic of falsifiability and the relevant methodology. For example, if 
a ferrous metal is shown to be not influenced by magnetic fields, 
then it cannot be said that all ferrous metals are affected by 
magnetic fields. Thus the Popperian paradigm says that a scientific 
law is falsifiable but not conclusively verifiable. However 
methodological errors import a dimension of uncertainty: could 
there have been an experimental error which probably influenced 
the outcome of the experiment? 
Thus in actual practice, one single counter-example is not sufficient 
to falsify a theory. This is the reason for retaining scientific theories 
in many cases despite anomalous evidence. The OPERA 
experiment, a collaborative scientific effort between CERN, Geneva 
and LNGS, Italy, for detecting neutrinos, a subatomic particle, 
reported findings that said neutrinos were found to travel faster 
than light. Scientists announced this result in September, 2011. 
However the scientific community retained belief on Einstein’s 
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theory of relativity that specifies an upper limit to the velocity of 
any particle, namely the velocity of light. However, later concerned 
scientists admitted two errors in their experimental set-up (Mitra, 
2016). 
According to Popper, based on the criterion of demarcation using 
falsifiability, among other things, physics, chemistry, non-
introspective psychology can be classified as sciences, psycho-
analysis as pre-science and astrology and phrenology as pseudo-
sciences. 
Unlike many social scientists, in Popper’s view, the more 
improbable a theory is, the more competent it is scientifically, as 
the probability of a theory to be true and its information content are 
inversely proportional to each other. Thus statements which closely 
approach truth are those with high information content although 
improbable. 
Popper, although initially skeptical about the concept of truth – he 
considered a theory to be an open-ended hypothesis and hence 
potentially false – later in his Conjectures and Refutations (1963) 
integrated the concepts of truth and content (a new theory has 
more empirical content than an old one) to frame the concept of 
verisimilitude or truth-likeliness. The content of a theory is the sum 
total of its logical consequences, divisible into two classes: ‘truth 
content’, the class of true propositions derivable from it, and the 
‘falsity content’, the class of false consequences; this may be an 
empty set. 
3. Review of Literature 
Derksen (1985) critiques Popper’s concept of falsifiability and calls 
it ‘fake cement’ to achieve methodological unity in the philosophy 
of science. He examines Popper’s epistemology and suggests that 
apparently the concept of falsifiability leads to a ‘great chain’ of 
concepts, all linked to falsifiability. A wide variety of desiderata, 
such as most falsifiable, most testable, most informative and the 
best corroborated are all achievable simultaneously. However 
Derksen (1985) claims that there are inherent ambiguities in the 
Popperian concept of falsifiabilty. As a result, the great chain 
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disintegrates along with the methodological unanimity that goes 
with it. 
Derksen (1985) examines the great chain in detail. According to 
Popper, any learning is possible through falsifying our guesses. 
Hence the first claim in this chain is: “only from our mistakes can 
we learn”. This is actually falsifiability, or criticizabilty, a broader 
term.  
Now, if learning is possible only through mistakes, scientific 
theories should be open to empirical falsification. Generalizing this, 
a more falsifiable theory has a better probability of being falsified, 
and hence is more scientific. Or in other words, the scientific 
character of a theory is measurable and falsifiabilty is its metric. 
Popper goes on to argue that a highly falsifiable theory has “little 
chance to escape falsification”. A bolder theory not only presents 
more risks of falsification, it also offers more opportunity to learn 
something new, thus offering scientific knowledge a chance to 
grow. Hence Popper’s second claim is: a more falsifiable theory 
offers a better opportunity of scientific growth.  
Another link of falsifiability with Popper’s deductivist thought is 
that a highly falsifiable theory contains more information. The 
converse is true as well; a theory with no falsifiers has no empirical 
content. Hence the initial links of the ‘great chain’ are: falsifiability 
links informative content links (larger) class of potential falsifiers. 
Popper further contends that the most falsifiable theory is also the 
one with the highest explanatory capacity and one with the 
maximum simplicity. A theory can be made more falsifiable either 
by making the theory more general, or by using a more specific 
predicate. Examples are: all crows are black to all birds are black for 
the first way; all crows are black or brown to all crows are black for 
the second way. Thus it follows that explanatory power increases 
as falsifiability increases. As regards simplicity, Popper quotes the 
example of the hypothesis stating that planets revolve around the 
sun in circles as compared to the less simple elliptical orbits. The 
circle hypothesis can be falsified by four observations, whereas the 
elliptical hypothesis can be falsified through at least six 
observations. Also, the circle hypothesis is more precise as all 
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circles constitute a subset of ellipses. Hence it can be seen that 
simplicity and falsifiability are positively correlated.  
Hence the great chain is reached: falsifiability  potential falsifiers 
 testability  information content  explanatory power  
simplicity. 
Popper later realized that only falsification is not enough. A 
scientist has to be certain that his more falsifiable, and consequently 
falsified theories are heading him in the ‘right direction’. Popper 
(1960) says that when all new attempts at theory building are 
refuted, the scientist “would feel that we were producing a 
sequence of theories which … were ad-hoc and … that we were not 
getting any nearer to the truth”, and consequently “science would 
lose its empirical character”. Hence Popper amended the first claim 
to say: only through falsifications, occasionally interspersed with 
corroborations (this may be called an amended claim), can we 
learn. 
Popper claims in his L. Sc. D. that the theory which has resisted the 
most severe testing is also the most falsifiable theory which has not 
been falsified; hence this is the most corroborated theory. There are, 
however, questions regarding whether scientists actually test the 
most falsifiable theory and corroborate it, and hence the most 
corroborated theory is not necessarily the most falsifiable one. 
However, if one follows Popper’s advice, that is, testing the most 
falsifiable theory, then the last link in the great chain is added:  
The most corroborated theory  the most falsifiable theory yet to 
be falsified. 
However, Popper’s ‘Great Chain’ experiences tension as illustrated 
below. It is possible to argue that the most corroborated theory at 
one point of time which has been tested most thoroughly is no 
longer the most falsifiable one. This is because the “most risky 
predictions” have been tested, and the comparatively less risky 
ones are yet to be tested. Hence with a smaller probability of 
refutation, these less risky predictions do not make the theory most 
falsifiable currently. Also, corroborated experiments, which are 
now part of scientific knowledge, leaves much less scope for 
counterexamples to occur, thus decreasing the severity of the tests. 
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This implies that falsifiability as indicated by testability of a theory 
decreases with time. Popper admits as much: “empirical character 
of a very successful theory grows stale after a time” (Popper, 1972). 
Falsifiablity under the Popperian paradigm shows up as 
falsifiabilty as information content and also falsifiabilty as 
testability. While a theory is successful against falsification, its 
information content and its explanatory power remain constant, 
whereas its testability decreases. ‘Corroboration’, a complement to 
testability, hence, changes. The ‘chain’ linked with a single concept 
of falsifiabilty comes under strain: is falsifiabilty to be reckoned as 
information content or testability? 
So the question boils down to: which theory do we test? The most 
testable theory (best chance to learn) or the most corroborated 
theory (to be closer to the truth)? Suppose that we settle for the 
most testable theory, as this offers the greatest chance to learn. 
Science, after all, is an endeavor to learn from our mistakes; this 
maintains the empirical character and rationality inherent in 
sciences. However, going by our amended claim, we also need 
occasional corroborations. How can the riskiest and most testable 
theory guarantee that? Since Popper says that corroboration should 
emerge as a result of the most severe test, it is clear that we need 
the most testable theory, and hope for occasional corroboration and 
finally falsification. Here, Popper makes his third claim: 
“corroboration gives us a reason for believing that science has come 
closer to the truth.” 
Popper propounded methodological directives as to which theories 
should be chosen to test: 
• The most falsifiable, informative, testable theories for 
obvious reasons 
• The most corroborated theory; this is the most severely 
tested theory, “appears to be the best so far”, and hence is 
‘rational’ 
To offer a solution to the issue narrated in the earlier paragraph, 
Popper propounded two more directives:  
• A new theory must cover successes of the old theory 
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• An old theory should be an approximation of the new 
theory 
These directives are relevant when an old theory has been tested so 
much that its “empirical character has grown stale”. Popper offers 
an elegant way out of the issue raised in the preceding paragraph. 
We need to know that we are moving in the “right direction”; 
hence the old theory has to be approximately true. Since the new 
theory has to preserve all past successes it can be seen that the 
directives by Popper imply choosing the most testable theory 
among the most corroborated, convergent ones. 
Derksen (1985) shows that Popper’s third claim carries the weight 
of the amended first claim and the second claim. Popper extends 
arguments in support of the third claim, namely, the verisimilitude 
argument, and the highly unlikely accident argument. Popper puts 
the later thus: a theory which has withstood a series of different 
and risky tests, it is “highly improbable this is due to an accident, 
highly improbable therefore that the theory is miles away from the 
truth.”Although apparently a deductivist argument, Derksen 
concludes that since the future is involved it is an inductivist 
argument. Hence claim three cannot be explained by Popper’s 
deductivism. Hence the first two claims are not so meaningful. Also 
testability and information content, as shown earlier, are 
disassociated. Hence, Derksen concludes that falsifiabilty is ‘fake 
cement’. 
Gillies (2003) comments on a challenge to falsifiability as the 
demarcation criterion, known as Duhem-Quine thesis, which was 
brought to the fore by Neurath in 1935 and was based on the work 
of Duhem. The following presents the gist of the thesis. 
It is agreed on common consent that Newton’s first law of motion 
is a scientific law. As it happens, it is not falsifiable. This law states 
that a body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a 
straight line, unless acted upon by an external impressed force. Let 
it be supposed a body is found neither at rest nor at uniform 
motion in a straight line, which it seems is not acted upon by any 
external force. This observation seemingly refutes Newton’s law, 
but in reality this does not necessarily hold true. Newton himself 
on observing the elliptical orbits of planets came to the conclusion 
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that they were acted on by gravitational forces from celestial bodies 
other than the sun.  
This issue is discussed by Duhem (1962) as cited in the 
“Underdetermination of Scientific Theory” (2019)“…the physicist 
can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but 
only a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in 
disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is that at least 
one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and 
ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which 
one should be changed.” 
Going by the above, Newton’s first law cannot be tested on its own 
as a standalone hypothesis, but only as a group of hypotheses. For 
meaningful results, the law should be used in conjunction with: 
one, further assumptions, such as Newton’s second and third laws 
and the law of universal gravitation; and two, auxiliary 
assumptions, such as the mass of the sun is much greater than that 
of the planets. 
Since the first law needs to be used in conjunction with many 
assumptions, it would not be possible to refute the law in case 
forecasts from the law are not realized, as any further assumptions 
and/or auxiliary assumptions might not hold. Hence, by the 
Duhem-Quine thesis Newton’s first law is not falsifiable. 
Popper replied to the issue. He used a four-level model of types of 
statements divided on the basis of their falsifiability and 
conformability. Gillies (2003) extend this in Table 1: 
Table 1: Popper’s Four-level Model of Scientific Hypotheses; (source: 
Gillies, 2003) 
Level Type of 
Statement 
Criterion Example 
3 Metaphysical Not confirmable Greek atomism 
2 Scientific Confirmable but not falsifiable Newton’s first 
law 
1 Scientific Falsifiable and confirmable Kepler’s first law 
0 Observation Truth-value determinable by 
observation 
Statement of 
position of Mars 
at a point in time 
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Gillies (2003) points out where the ideas of Kuhn and Popper 
converge. Level 2 theories, such as Newton’s first law, cannot be 
falsified through observation as shown in Table 1. According to 
Thomas Kuhn the Newtonian paradigm was replaced by the 
Einstinian paradigm not through one single observation, but 
through a process of “scientific revolution”. This is expected in the 
case of level two theories which cannot be falsified. However, the 
Popperian scheme of falsification is applicable to level-one theories. 
Moreover, a level one hypothesis such as Kepler’s first law (that 
states that planets orbit around a star in ellipses with the star at its 
one focus) can be tested by observing the positions of the planet 
and ascertaining that these points lie on the circumference of the 
ellipse with defined parameters. This may be called direct 
confirmation. Newton’s laws, along with a few additional 
assumptions, mentioned earlier, can deduce an approximate form 
of Kepler’s law. Newton’s theory can however be confirmed by 
observation on planets, motions of projectiles and so on. The 
confirmation of Newtonian theory, along with the fact that Kepler’s 
first law in an approximate form is obtained from Newtonian 
theory is a pointer to an indirect confirmation of Kepler’s law. 
Popper (1972) wrote something similar: 
 “Thus I assert that with the corroboration of Newton’s theory, and 
the description of the earth as a rotating planet, the degree of 
corroboration of the statement s ‘The sun rises in Rome once in 
every twenty-four hours’ has greatly increased. For, on its own, s is 
not very well testable; but Newton’s theory, and the theory of the 
rotation of the earth are well testable. And if these are true, s will be 
true also.” 
The Duhem-Quine thesis says that it would be impossible to falsify 
an individual theory experimentally. Can the Popperian paradigm 
guide us in detecting errors in individual theories? Maxwell (1972) 
describes the following thought experiment in this regard. Let us 
consider two rival research programs based on two competing 
theories T1 and T2. The program based on T1 has long been stagnant; 
a number of well-corroborated hypotheses are at odds with this. 
The program has also not been able to come up with new 
predictions.  
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The research program based on T2 is surging ahead. Its empirical 
content and predictive power are far more. Popperian rules 
indicate that T2 should be accepted and T1 rejected.  
But if T1 is true (perfectly possible), then on what basis should T1 be 
rejected?  The logic advanced by Maxwell is that perhaps the 
universe is built in such a way that theories which plunge us into 
deeper errors are precisely the programs which forge ahead. 
However, the Popperian paradigm has no clear answer to this 
dilemma. The argument that T2 has been more corroborated than T1 
implies that T2 is closer to the truth cannot be invoked by followers 
of Popper as that would mean resorting to the unreliable inductive 
method! 
Turney (1991)  in an interesting paper points out certain ‘errors’ in 
Popper (1959) where Popper says that simplicity can be equated to 
falsifiability. Popper uses a geometrical example to develop his 
argument. He proposes two definitions and a theorem. 
Definition 1: The theoretical dimension of a class of geometrical 
figures is one less than the cardinality of the smallest set of points 
such that there is no figure in the class on which all the points lie. 
Definition 2: The geometrical dimension of a class of geometrical 
figures is the number of free parameters in the equations that 
define the class. 
As an example, the equation for the class of circles is: 
Ax2 + Ay2 + Bx + Cy + D = 0 
This has four parameters, A, B, C, and D but since the equation 
determines the value of one of them, hence the number of free 
parameters is three; the geometrical dimension of the class of circles 
is three. A lower geometrical dimension translates to a simpler 
class. 
Theorem: The geometrical dimension of a class of geometrical 
figures equals the theoretical dimension of that class. 
Turney (1991) claims that the theorem is false. Let us consider the 
conic 
Ax2 + Bxy + Cy2 + Dx + Ey + F = 0 where at least one of A, B, C, D, 
E is not equal to 0. 
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For a circle: A=C, A is not equal to 0; B=0. The requirement that at 
least one of A, B, C, D, E be non-zero arises from the fact that if A = 
B= C= D= E= F= 0, then the solution is the entire x-y plane with 
infinite dimensions. 
Considering the class of circles, since they have three free 
parameters, hence it has a geometrical dimension of three. Turney 
shows that it has a theoretical dimension of two. Let us consider the 
set of 3 points P = ((0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 2)). Using the conic equation, we 
get, 
F=0 
A+B+C+D+E+F=0 
4A+4B+4C+2D+ 2E+F=0 
This implies A=0, which is a contradiction, as A is not equal to 0 for 
a circle. On dropping this condition, certain undesirable results are 
obtained.  
• Circles are not special cases of ellipses 
• Lines are special cases of ellipses 
Hence we do not drop this condition, thereby implying no circle 
contains all points in P. Hence the class of circles has a theoretical 
dimension of two, not three and geometrical dimension of three.  
Such results can be illustrated with other conics as well. 
Goodman (1972) as cited in Turney (1991), has also shown an 
inconsistency in Popper’s equalizing falsifiability with simplicity. 
Let us suppose a number of maple trees have been examined from 
a wide area and all of them have been found to be deciduous. 
Further suppose we have not visited a particular location, 
Eagleville. A choice among the following hypotheses is what we 
might be considering: 
• All maples are deciduous, except those in Eagleville 
• All maples are deciduous 
• All maples elsewhere and all sassafras trees in Eagleville are 
deciduous. 
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Clearly the third statement is most specific and the easiest to falsify, 
whereas the second is the easiest and the best. Thus Goodman 
concludes that there is no reason to necessarily equate simplicity to 
falsifiability. 
Keita (1989) raises three important issues regarding falsification of 
universal statements: 
• If induction does not work, then a scientific law L derived 
from a finite set of universal statements is false. Then the 
veracity of a theory which is constituted by L is 
questionable. The implication is that Popper attempts to 
falsify ‘false’ theories. 
• In actual science, researchers attach a predictive judgment 
before testing a hypothesis which has already been subject 
to experiments. This is really resorting to the inductive 
method. However, in case of statistical inference (which are 
not strictly scientific laws as they do not predict events with 
a probability one and are not explanatory but correlational) 
scientific laws are “established by enumeration of particular 
events”.  
• Actual scientific laws are not universal statements but are 
restricted in temporal and spatial scope. For instance, 
Henry’s law, a law in the theory of Phase Equilibria: “At a 
fixed temperature, the amount of gas dissolved in a given 
quantity of solvent is proportional to the partial pressure of 
the gas above the solution or P=XK where K is Henry’s 
constant. But Henry’s law is applicable to finite class of 
gases subjected to experiments which defines a set of 
conditions such as temperature and pressure. If in T1 to Tn-1 
experimental conditions this law has been satisfied then it 
would be prudent to infer that it would be satisfied at time 
Tn. Thus this takes the sting out of the criticism that 
induction takes a leap out of a finite set to an unrestricted 
class. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
The following Table 2 records insights and discusses them from the 
preceding review of literature conducted in section 3 in a 
structured manner.  
Table 2: Insights from the Review of Literature  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author(s), 
year 
Discussion 
(Derksen, 
1985) 
The verisimilitude argument of Popper can be stated as 
“in case a theory withstands a set of risky and varied tests, 
it is highly improbable that this is due to an accident…”. It 
has been correctly pointed out by  Derksen (1985) that 
with respect to the past and present the argument is non-
inductivist but is inductivist with respect to the future. 
The rationale that can justify Popper’s reasoning is that 
the future is similar to the past. But this is an inductivist 
argument. Hence this contradicts Popper’s deductivism. 
Hence Derksen’s argument is valid.  
(Gillies, 
2003) 
Popper, it seems, broadly agreed with the critique, and he 
answered the critique with a four-level model of 
statements based on their falsification and conformability. 
The critique is a valid one. The critique and the 
consequent four-level model of Popper led to an 
understanding (Gillies, 2003) that level two ‘statements’ 
such as Newton’s second law had to be falsified through a 
“scientific revolution” as proposed by Thomas Kuhn.   
(Maxwell, 
1972) 
The paper strikes at the basis of Popper’s philosophy, 
namely, the ability of Popper’s methodology and logic to 
demarcate science from non-science. The issue of two 
competing research programs T1 and T2 is well dealt. The 
weakness of some of Popper’s arguments, seemingly 
deductivistic, but actually shown to be inductivistic is 
witnessed in this article as well. 
(Turney, 
1991) 
Popper claims that the geometrical dimension of a class of 
geometrical figures is equal to the theoretical dimension 
of that class. He, however, does not prove it. Popper’s 
claim is not founded on reasoning. Popper’s general claim 
that simplicity is the same as falsifiabilty is dented. 
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5. Conclusion 
A major critique of Popper is that Popper’s methodology of 
falsification is based on the despised (by Popper) inductive method 
(Derksen, 1985; Keita, 1989; Maxwell, 1972). This makes Popper’s 
methodologies and assertions on falsifiability open to arguments. 
In any case, actual empirical science generally uses induction and 
actual scientific laws are situated in specific spatio-temporal 
contexts, thus countering Popper’s critique that inductivists take a 
wild leap of faith when interpolating their findings to a universal 
context. The second critique, which Popper agreed with and replied 
by strengthening his framework, is the Duhem-Quine thesis: actual 
science considers a group of hypotheses and in tandem, and in 
such cases whereas individual hypothesis are falsifiable, the group 
is only confirmable and not falsifiable. Third, while Popper equated 
simplicity with falsifiabilty, researchers such as Goodman (1972) 
and Turney (1991) have picked up flaws in this argument as well.   
The paper takes a look at the various dimensions of the falsification 
criterion using a review of the extant literature. Various researchers 
have identified deficiencies in Popper’s epistemology: also actual 
science works not necessarily in accordance with how Popper 
visualizes it. Nonetheless, Popper’s falsifiability remains a very 
strong criterion, especially where research can be founded on 
value-laden assumptions such as in the social sciences including 
management, and scientists willing to subject their research to 
(Goodman, 
1972) 
In the limited context, Goodman’s argument holds. 
However, whether the second statement which is 
linguistically most simple is actually most simple or not 
may be open to argument.   
(Keita, 
1989) 
Induction is a recurring theme in almost all critique of 
Popper’s methodology. It is also a fact that induction does 
play a part in science, but that is not a problem with 
Popper’s argument. With regard to Henry’s law, the 
inductive approach cannot test for all possible situations 
in the restricted “temporal and spatial scope”. Hence 
Popper’s criterion of falsifiability as a criterion of 
demarcating science from non-science remains valid.  
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more difficult tests for falsifiability would constitute sound 
research practice. 
As a student of philosophy of sciences, one would contend that the 
idea of probabilistic verification of Kuhn (1970) is in many cases a 
good guide to philosophy of sciences. Normal science, according to 
Kuhn, advances by probabilistic verification of competing theories, 
wherein the better theory becomes the most viable one through a 
process similar to natural selection. There is always an imperfect 
data-theory fit and in case of severe inconsistency, testing the 
theory through falsification would require a degree of falsification 
or level of improbability which leads to probabilistic verification. In 
this regard, Popper and Kuhn share a degree of unanimity.  
References 
Derksen, A. (1985). The alleged unity of Popper’s philosophy of science: 
Falsifiability as fake cement. Philosophical Studies, 48(3), 313–336. 
Duhem, P. (1962). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, translated by 
Philip P. Weiner. New York: Athenaeum. 
Gillies, D. (2003). The Demarcation Problem and Alternative Medicine. 
Presented at the Karl R. Popper: Revision of his Legacy, La Coruna, 
Spain. Retrieved from http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17002/1/17002.pdf 
Goodman, N. (1972). Problems and Projects, Bobbs-Merrill Co. New York 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. 
Keita, L. (1989). Are universal statements falsifiable? Journal for General 
Philosophy of Science, 20(2), 351–366. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Maxwell, N. (1972). A critique of Popper’s views on scientific method. 
Philosophy of Science, 39(2), 131–152. 
Mitra, S. (2016). What Constitutes Science: Falsifiability as a Criterion of 
Demarcation. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.1.4612.5685 
Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery (Second Harper 
Torchbook edition  1968). Harper and Row. 
Popper, K. R. (1960). Truth, rationalism and the growth of science. Presented 
at the International Congress for the Philosophy of Science, Stanford, 
Stanford University. 
Popper, K. R. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. Oxford 
University Press. 
Popper, K. R. (2002). The logic of scientific discovery. Routledge. 
Suddhachit Mitra                            An Analysis of the Falsification Criterion 
18 
 
Stanford, K. (2019). Underdetermination of scientific theory. In Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved from https:// 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/ 
Thornton, S. (2019). Karl Popper. In Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. 
Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ 
Turney, P. (1991). A note on Popper’s equation of simplicity with 
falsifiability. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 42(1), 105–
109. 
 
